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Bargaining for Contract Academic Staff at English Canadian Universities 
 
 
Jula Hughes and David Bell ∗ 
 
Abstract 
Successful unionization of, and conclusion of collective agreements for, contract 
academic staff in English Canada challenges the received wisdom that the Wagner Act 
model is an insurmountable obstacle to the unionization of contingent labour. It provides 
an example that might prove instructive for other contingent workers. This paper 
describes the process of unionization of contract academic staff in English Canada and 
seeks to explain its relative success. We suggest that the exceptional situation of 
contract academic staff as non-unionized workers in an otherwise unionized 
environment, access to the expertise and resources of large, national unions or 
associations and a sophisticated national strategy were contributing factors to 
successful unionization. The paper also considers the degree to which contract academic 
staff collective agreements fulfill or fall short of the promise of unionization. We analyze 
sample collective agreements, noting the variety and strength of various contractual 
models. We conclude by suggesting that contract academic staff have benefitted 
considerably from unionization. Despite these successes, the experience of contract 
academic staff supports critiques of the Wagner Act model as applied to contingent 
labour. 
 
  
                                                     
∗ Jula Hughes and David Bell teach in the Faculty of Law at the University of New 
Brunswick. Both acted as chief negotiators for contract academic staff. The authors are 
grateful to the contract academic members of our bargaining teams (Wendy Bourque, 
Stephen Dutcher and Arthur James) for educating us about academic issues and for their 
unfailing advocacy for contract academic colleagues. We also acknowledge gratefully 
the research assistance of Leah Ferguson and Mark Coombs.   
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1. Contingent academic labour 
Contingent academic workers go by many labels and have a variety of tenures within 
their overall contingency.1  They are called term employees, sessional lecturers, stipend 
instructors, part-time instructors, per-course teachers, contract academics, or simply 
adjuncts.  Here, we focus on the most precarious class of contingent academics – those 
appointed to teach on an individual course basis, so that when the course ends their 
employment ends.  We call this group contract academic staff to distinguish its 
members from regular (that is, so-called full-time) academics.  As is often noted, the 
distinction between part-time and full-time is ironic in that often contract academic 
staff have heavier teaching loads than tenure-stream appointees.  
 In the history of ‘organizing the unorganized’, contingent labour has always 
presented particular challenges. Some challenges relate to contingent workers as a 
transient workforce: relatively poor opportunities for organization, worker isolation, 
lack of legal resources and the absence of ties to the traditional labour movement. 
Others arise from the Wagner Act model of labour law, the particular framework of 
labour legislation that forms the backdrop to all organizing efforts in Canada. Despite 
these obstacles, Canada has seen the near universal unionization of one group of 
contingent workers, viz. contract academic staff. This paper explores successes, failures 
and lessons in the certification and collective bargaining of contract academic staff at 
universities in English Canada since the 1980s in the context of the broader labour 
movement.  
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At first blush, and in the popular imagination, it might be a stretch to think of 
contract academic workers as part of the Precariat.2 After all, they are well educated, 
they work in a high prestige work environment, and to their students they are 
indistinguishable from their tenure-track and tenured colleagues. They do not conjure 
up images of Grapes of Wrath. And yet, this seems to be a never-ending stream of news 
items in the past few years reporting on the plight of contract academic staff.3  
In a recent study, the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO) suggested that it is important to 
recognize that vulnerability and precariousness attach to work rather than to 
individuals.4  It is entirely possible to be in a situation of precarious work without 
attracting other indicia of marginalization. For contract academic staff, the definition of 
precarious work adopted by the LCO is apt:  
Precarious work is characterized by lack of continuity, low wages, lack of 
benefit and possibly greater risk of injury and ill health. … Measures of 
precariousness are level of earnings, level of employer-provided benefits, 
degree of regulatory protection and degree of control or influence within 
the labour process.5 
 
This definition captures some of the vulnerabilities of contingent academic 
workers. They face disjointed and uncertain employment contracts, wages that 
frequently fall below minimum wage if accounted on an hourly basis, and typically have 
no employer-sponsored benefits. They also lack control or influence over processes of 
hiring, evaluation, discipline and termination.  In addition, contingent academic workers 
face peculiar vulnerabilities. These include a lack of academic freedom, a lack of ability 
to participate in collegial governance, inadequate or absent recognition of research and 
3
Hughes and Bell: Bargaining for Contract Academic Staff at English Canadian Univer
Published by The Keep, 2015
 4 
service for evaluation purposes, inadequate choice of teaching spaces and materials, 
and an exclusion from the informational and relational networks of the university. 
Wages, job security and benefits are the bread-and-butter of union work. One 
would expect to see significant improvements in these areas from unionization. Beyond 
that, trade unions generally, and public sector unions in particular, have a tradition of 
mobilizing union solidarity for the purposes of workplace democratization. Participation 
in governance, control over advancement, a voice in policymaking and the pacing of 
limits on managerial discretion are hallmarks of this aspect of union work. It is difficult 
to imagine a workplace for which this is more relevant than the academic workplace. 
But before any of these benefits might accrue, there has to be successful organization 
and collective bargaining. 
 Canadian labour law makes neither particularly easy. It is well understood that 
the Canadian labour relations model owes much to its American parent, the Wagner 
Act.6 Its chief features are majority rule and exclusivity. These two principles represent a 
quid pro quo wherein the union must demonstrate majority support in exchange for the 
right to be recognized by the employer as the sole bargaining agent and representative 
of the workforce.  
 The paradigmatic workplace has been  the industrial plant, where all workers 
would be organized by the same union.  Establishing majorities is fairly straightforward 
in this context because all workers participate in a single site during regular working 
hours. It is easy to see that contract academic staff do not fit this model well. The 
certification procedure, particularly the difficulty of identifying, finding and speaking 
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with workers, is difficult for a workforce that does not have consistent working hours or 
centralized work or break locations. Some university employers add to these difficulties 
by interfering with informational and other union activity on campus.  
 Labour legislation restricts anti-union activities by employers, but labour boards 
are sometimes reluctant to enforce prohibitions against unfair labour practices strictly 
lest they be drawn into the certification process prematurely and end up being 
perceived as interfering with the ability of workers to make up their own minds about 
unionization. The impact of this kind of self-restraint can be considerable.7  In the past 
two decades, the labour law environment has also changed in ways that makes it more 
difficult for organizing drives to succeed. In particular, the imposition of mandatory 
votes in many jurisdictions operates to provide additional opportunities for employers 
to interfere with organizing and to make organizing drives less successful.8  
 Exclusivity, that is the right of the union to be the exclusive bargaining agent for 
a group of employees for which the union has majority support, is generally thought of 
as the reward of certification. However, for contingent labour, the right to exclusive 
representation may also represent a challenge. The bargaining agent becomes solely 
responsible for representing employees --not only with respect to the collective 
agreement, but under the expanded vision of the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitrators 
developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in recent years with respect to human rights 
matters, employment standards matters, Occupational Health & Safety and, frequently, 
for the administration of personal and human rights-based harassment policies. These 
5
Hughes and Bell: Bargaining for Contract Academic Staff at English Canadian Univer
Published by The Keep, 2015
 6 
representational obligations require legal resources and expertise as well as staff or 
volunteer union resources.  
 A common employer strategy for limiting bargaining power is to resist the 
preference of labour boards for single bargaining units representing all employees and 
to promote a fracturing of the workforce into groups of workers with allegedly 
contradictory or competing interests. Not infrequently do employees contribute to this 
fracturing by understanding their own position vis-à-vis other employees of the same 
employer as qualitatively different. Professional employees, in particular, have a long 
history of either resisting unionization or resisting their inclusion into a common 
bargaining unit. This is certainly the case for academic workers. In particular, there 
tends to be a high rate of contract academic staff from professions that have, at least 
historically, often been opposed to unionization. These include lawyers, physicians, 
architects and dentists.  
 From an international and comparative perspective, the Wagner Act model is 
rather unusual. In most other countries, labour legislation does not operate to divide 
the workforce into tiny bargaining units and does not require representatives of 
employee interests to win the support of the majority of employees in each micro-unit 
to be recognized.9 Alternatives include minority unions, sector bargaining,10 and 
employee councils.11  
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2. The unionization movement 
Unionization came to contract academic staff in the last quarter of the 20th century, 
at the same time that regular academics were unionizing. In English Canada, regular 
academics began forming professional associations after World War I and  began 
converting these associations into unions in the 1970s.  Within a decade, unionization 
was quite general in publically-funded universities, with the notable exceptions of 
McGill and Toronto. 12  It seems fair to say that until the 1980s regular academics, 
whether in management or in the union, still viewed the presence of contract academic 
staff within the university as temporary and anomalous.  To regular academics, part-
timers were engineers or lawyers brought in to teach a specialized course, or they were 
graduate students picking up a bit of income and teaching experience while waiting for 
their real careers to take off.  Such peripheral status did not merit the effort of 
normalization. 
 What brought contract academic staff slowly into view was the funding crunch 
that overtook public universities in the 1970s, intensifying by the early 1980s into a new 
normal.  The same budgetary stringency at a time of high inflation that led faculty 
associations to respond by turning themselves into unions also prompted university 
managements to see how they might cover courses and contain costs by using stranded 
graduate students as contingent, teaching-only academic labour.  As the historian of 
York put it, it was only by use of such contract academics that the university made ends 
meet.  In 1976 the Council of Ontario Universities feared the casualization was “now 
going on apace.”  A decade later it acknowledged what it saw as a new order of 
7
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academics, ones holding “concurrent part-time appointments in several institutions or 
combin[ing] academic duties with other employment in their efforts to stitch together 
an adequate income.”  Of the challenges these “gypsy scholars” faced, it noted that 
“new course responsibilities, which may differ from those of the year previous, require 
fresh preparatory work; travel time and costs may be multiplied; the insecure economic 
circumstances have their own destabilizing effects.” Not only did these contract 
academic staff come cheap; they were also throwaways.  As the president of Dalhousie 
recalled of this time, an employer in financial trouble could and did dispense with their 
services quite readily.13 
 The long university funding crisis that began in the 1970s came just as expanded 
graduate programs were populated by students whose academic job prospects now 
seemed bleak.  It was these graduate students who began pushing for better wages, 
regularized hiring and limited class sizes by forming union locals.14  Twenty years later, 
disappointed job hopes for would-be academics remained a primary impetus to 
unionization.   Of the certification drive at Dalhousie, which began in 1992, the historian 
writes that: 
The timing was perhaps a result of conditions in the academic job market 
changing for the worse, so that there were fewer full-time positions 
available and more part-timers being hired by the universities. …  By the 
1990s only a minority of the part-time faculty and the graduate student 
TAs had any confidence of ever obtaining a tenured position in a 
university. Without any secure hope of future full-time employment, why 
should TAs or part-time faculty work for such low wages?15 
 
The first part-time academics in English Canada to unionize did so in the early 
1970s, forming an umbrella organization known as the Graduate Assistants Association.  
8
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As the name suggests, the earliest bargaining units (Toronto) included only teaching 
assistants; but when Local 3 formed at York in 1975, it covered both TAs and Contract 
Academics.16  Thereafter, most locals included both groups, prompting a name change 
in 1980 to Canadian Union of Educational Workers (CUEW).  By the time CUEW 
amalgamated with the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) in 1994, it had 9 
locals, most of composite membership.  
 On most campuses where contract academic staff unionised in the 1970s and 
1980s, the move came shortly after certification of the university’s regular academic 
faculty association.  Yet there were only rare cases (Regina, 1977; Laurentian, Windsor & 
Calgary, 1994) where contract academic staff unionized as part of that faculty 
association.  It is worth asking why.  Unionization of English Canada’s regular academics 
began in 1974 when some faculty at St Mary’s University invited CUPE to organize them.  
Although the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) favoured faculty 
unionization in principle, it reacted to the CUPE foray with alarm.  It feared, on one 
hand, that faculty associations would fall into the hands of a non-academic union, and, 
on the other, that conservative academics’ disdain for a large, militant union like CUPE 
might kill the prospects for unionization in the country generally.17   CAUT won its 
campaign at St Mary’s to secure victory for its own affiliate rather than CUPE, and soon 
CAUT-allied unions dominated English Canadian university campuses.  Higher education 
would become the country’s most thoroughly unionized job sector.18  But the question 
remains:  If CAUT could mobilize so successfully to win the battle for unionization of 
regular academics, then why did it not lead a similar charge to persuade its many 
9
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affiliates unionizing in the 1970s and 1980s to include contract academic staff within 
their ranks? 
While CAUT recognized the strategic advantage of faculty unions positioned to 
bargain with the employer on behalf of both regular academics and contract academic 
staff, this was not the view of many tenure-stream faculty themselves.  Indeed, CAUT’s 
own attitude towards the role of contract academic staff was severely negative.  It saw 
the proliferation of per course instructors on campus as an “abuse” and a “threat.”  
Their presence undermined faculty bargaining power, diluted academic freedom and 
circumvented tenure.  Moreover, contract academic staff were probably not even good 
teachers as their opportunity to keep abreast of their field was necessarily limited.19  
CAUT’s official policy was that its affiliates secure collective agreement language that 
restricted employment of contract academic staff to the filling of temporary vacancies 
or providing unusual expertise.  Regular academic collective agreements commonly did 
secure some version of these limitations.  They could do so the more readily because 
their campus unions had not reached out to include contract academic staff bargaining 
units and so did not have to accommodate their bargaining needs. 
 With such attitudes prevailing among regular academics, it is unsurprising that 
most 20th century contract academic staff affiliated with CUEW, and later CUPE, rather 
than  with their campus faculty association.  As recalled by Michael Earle, an organizer 
of the CUPE local that covers Dalhousie and two other Halifax universities, , “part-time 
and limited-term lecturers could never expect their interests to be properly represented 
by the tenured faculty unions.”  Regular academics might sympathize with the plight of 
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part-timers, “but this sympathy doesn't naturally extend to any steps which might 
jeopardize their own pay and privileges.” They would “invariably choose to seek 
improvements in their own conditions and pay rather than try to assist their under-
privileged occasional colleagues.” 
[T]hey feel the increased use of temporary replacement staff is 
weakening their university, if not threatening their own jobs. And so, in 
their collective agreements, they have generally succeeded in placing a 
cap of one-and-a-half or two part-time contracts being offered to any one 
individual. An improvement in the pay of such part-timers might lessen 
the number of limited-term contracts and thus strengthen the full time 
faculty's bargaining power, but, in negotiations, such considerations carry 
little weight for faculty union members. 
 
By 1995, the time Earle was writing, a few faculty unions did include contract 
academic staff; but, he thought it, “difficult to find a single example of any meaningful 
benefit being obtained for part-timers by the existing faculty unions.”20  A Canada-wide 
survey of regular academics taken about the same time found that 25% thought that 
contract academic staff should not be entitled to unionize at all, and half thought 
contract academic staff unionization would not be a positive thing for universities.21 
 Now, twenty years after Earle’s assessment, most contract academic staff in 
English Canadian universities are unionized.  However, the hesitancy of regular 
academics in following CAUT’s advice to invite or to entice contract academics into their 
ranks has meant that a large minority belong to locals of CUPE or the Public Service 
Alliance of Canada or independent unions.22  One might anticipate that  such 
unionization, under whatever banner, would so raise the cost of employing contract 
academic staff that there would be fewer of them.  In fact, research suggests that while 
11
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unionization has curbed use of contingent full-time academics, presumably because 
they are nearly as costly to employ as tenure-stream appointees, the casualization of 
the academy through per-course instructors continues apace.23   
3. Are there benefits to unionization for contract academic staff? Some thoughts 
on methodology. 
At one level, then, the success of unionization for contract academic staff is obvious. 
Unionization is near complete. At another level, it is less obvious that there has been 
any real benefit to contract academic staff arising from unionization. Methodologically, 
this raises the interesting question of how best to evaluate bargaining success. Much of 
the literature regarding bargaining power focuses on the private sector and uses 
predominantly an economic mode of analysis.24 It is widely thought that it is more 
difficult to evaluate bargaining power in the public sector. This is because wages may be 
a less important factor, or power in bargaining may be more diffuse, or because the 
ability of employers to respond to financial demands of unions in the private sector is 
thought to be different than that of public sector employers, and because public sector 
workers themselves are thought to be inherently risk-averse and therefore less likely to 
engage in job action. This may be true even for workers who are not subject to 
restrictions on the right to strike imposed in some public sector legislation. Recent 
litigation in Canada surrounding police officers suggests that this analysis of public 
sector workers may be an oversimplification. 
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For this study, we made an assumption that may be subject to valid criticism in that 
we have not tested it empirically. We assumed that the bargaining priorities of contract 
academic staff would be similar across the country. We based our understanding of 
bargaining priorities on what we learned in our own negotiations. Our faculty 
association, the Association of University of New Brunswick Teachers, engaged the 
contract academic membership through a series of surveys. The data from the surveys 
were used to inform the decisions of a contract academic bargaining committee who, in 
turn, gave direction to the bargaining team. The committee included both long-term 
contract academic members and full-time members experienced in collective 
bargaining. We take some comfort from the fact that the themes we identified did in 
fact appear in all of the collective agreements we considered. However, we are unable 
to make any assertions about the vigor with which each of the component demands 
were pursued by the various unions or indeed about how bargaining unit members 
might have prioritized the demands. 
 In our surveys, contract academic members identified remuneration, lack of job 
security, working conditions, and lack of benefits as chief priorities. Over the course of 
three (!) years of bargaining towards a first collective agreement, additional concerns 
arose with regard to participation in collegial governance, the ability to participate in 
and receive remuneration and/or credit for research and union/service work, exposure 
to managerial discretion and arbitrariness and the scope of academic freedom. For our 
study, we surmised that these themes would resonate with contract academic 
13
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colleagues across Canada. We recognize that there might be considerable variation in 
the prioritization of these objectives by location and over time, however. 
 Since our interest was in evaluating the success or otherwise of collective 
bargaining for contract academic staff, we also considered elements of the collective 
agreement that might provide insight into the structural supports for labour rights in the 
various universities. Particularly, we were interested in the relationship between full-
time and contract academic unions, and the degree to which the effectiveness of 
unionization was impaired by fracturing of the workforce into multiple bargaining units 
and, possibly, non-unionized groups. 
 In short, we approached the question of bargaining success not from the 
perspectives of comparison between the situation of contact academic staff prior to 
unionization and current terms and conditions of employment but, rather, by 
considering whether the bargaining objectives of contract academic staff have in fact 
been achieved in the process of collective bargaining. This methodology was chosen 
because the alternative would have required large adjustments to account for the 
historical development of contract academic bargaining units beginning in the 1970s. It 
seemed questionable whether the historical account would render useful data in light of 
the near complete unionization of contract academic staff at the present time. There is 
a considerable literature on the question for measuring what has sometimes been 
described as the union wage premium in terms of salaries.25  This literature 
demonstrates the complexities of such measurement. It may also be misleading. 
Maynard and Joseph suggest that job satisfaction of contract academic staff is tied 
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somewhat to preferences and the role of contract academic work in the life of an 
employee, and not only to comparability with full-time academic staff.26  
4. Analysis of collective agreements 
We included 19 universities in our study: 
 
 
 
 
 Alberta  Calgary  Carleton 
Dalhousie Manitoba McMaster Memorial Moncton Ottawa Saskatchewan  Simon Fraser  
St. Mary's Toronto  UBC UNB PEI Victoria  Western York
15
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The 19 universities, including the largest in each province other than Quebec, were 
chosen to be representative across the country as including the full range of universities from 
those with full medical and other professional schools, to provincial comprehensive 
universities, to liberal arts colleges. Of the 19 collective agreements, 9 are CUPE locals (2 of 
which, McMaster and Toronto, are affiliated with CAUT), 7 are represented by faculty 
associations affiliated with CAUT, one is represented by PSAC and there are 2 institutions, 
Ottawa and Simon Fraser, where contract academic staff are represented by freestanding 
bargaining agents. Ottawa was organized in 1986 as Local 10 of the Canadian Union of 
Educational Workers. It disaffiliated in 1992.   
 To put it more simply, roughly half of the collective agreements under study were 
negotiated by large public-sector unions while most of the others were negotiated by faculty 
associations and only 2 by unions not affiliated with either a public sector union or a faculty 
association. Most contract academic staff are in separate bargaining units from their full-time 
colleagues, but 5 of the 19 are covered by a single collective agreement together with full-time 
academic staff. All of the agreements in this latter category are faculty association agreements. 
The relevant time frame that was selected to examine the collective agreement was July 2010.  
Wages 
Comparing wages turned out to be more difficult than merely gathering wage data from 
collective agreements. This was because most, but not all, wages were expressed as a stipend 
based on three credit hours.  Other collective agreements use base salaries, FTEs [pro rata 
model], contact hours etc. Additionally, a number of agreements provide for experience 
increments or steps, as well as additional credit for the terminal degree in the relevant 
16
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discipline. Of the 19 collective agreements under study, we were able to determine a basic 
stipend rate for 15 agreements. For comparison purposes we excluded enhanced stipends. The 
average rate for a 3 credit hour course in the fall term of 2010 was $ $6,186. The median 
stipend was $5,300. The discrepancy between the average and the mean can be explained by 
the outlier, York University. The lowest stipend was $4296 (St. Mary's), the highest was $14,681 
(York). 27     
We considered a number of explanations for this variation in base stipends. We 
considered whether contract academic staff represented by public sector unions fared better or 
worse than contract academic staff represented by faculty associations.  
 
Except for outliers at each end of the spectrum, there was no significant difference.   
We also considered the passage of time since unionization and the size of the institution. We 
found no correlation between the timing of certification/first collective agreement, but we 
found that the size of the institution was strongly correlated to wages. Employer size is a well-
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known predictor of wages, though not typically of this size variation.28 No other factor came 
close to explaining the variation.  
 The following graph shows the distribution of stipends organized by size of the 
institution. For this, we used the number of FTE students as the measure of the size of the 
institution overall. 
  
 Anecdotally, we know that contract academic staff at York were on strike twice. 
Carleton University’s contract instructors who are represented by CUPE 4600 almost went on 
strike in March of 2014, however it was ultimately avoided. The University of Prince Edward 
Island contract academic staff who are represented by University of Prince Edward Island 
Faculty Association (UPEIFA) along with full time academic staff went on strike in 2006. 
Contract academic staff at Dalhousie also went on strike in 2004, they are represented by CUPE 
3912. At Western, the librarians and archivists went on strike in 2011, but not the contract 
academic staff. The University of Alberta is represented by an Association who is not unionized 
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and hence they have never had a strike. The University of Calgary contract academic staff have 
never been on strike nor do they have strike provisions in their collective agreement. The 
University of British Columbia does not have the right to strike because they were voluntarily 
recognized. One might consider whether the willingness of members of the bargaining unit to 
strike is what explains the outlier experience at York University, but we have not studied this 
empirically.   
 Whether one considers the median or even the higher average stipend, it is clear that 
contract academic staff continue to be severely underpaid. Teaching loads for full-time faculty 
vary of course and it is therefore difficult to make direct comparisons. It does seem reasonable 
to assume that a full teaching load is no more than 6 courses per year. At that rate, the annual 
deemed salary at contract academic rates would be between $31,800 (median) and $37,116 
(average). The rate of pay of contract academic staff does not meet or even approach the rate 
advocated for by the CAUT as part of its pro-rata model.29 
Job Security 
The second bargaining priority we used to evaluate bargaining success was gains in job 
security. In the absence of collective agreement, contract academic staff work from stipend-to-
stipend and contract-to-contract and improved job security was a prime goal of in our own 
bargaining experience. We coded collective agreements into four categories of job security: 
conversion, seniority-based, assessment-based, and minimal.  
The highest level of job security we labeled ‘conversion.’ Conversion refers to the 
possibility that, after teaching a certain number of stipends, the appointment is converted from 
a per-course appointment to a permanent appointment. Seniority-based job security included 
19
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all instances where employees acquire a right of recall based on seniority, akin to standard lay-
off and recall provisions in agreements outside the academic sector. In this category, 
assessments are either absent (true seniority) or they happen only once (somewhat akin to 
passing a probationary period review) and the employee was able to accrue seniority after that. 
The assessment-based category for job security refers to preferential recall rights (sometimes 
called rights of first refusal) based on periodic performance evaluations and interim seniority-
based recall. Finally, we classified job security as minimal where the employer retained 
discretion to hire new entrants preferentially, sometimes based on contractual criteria. Even 
this latter form of job security is an improvement over the entirely arbitrary and discretionary 
hiring practices prevailing in pre-unionized environments.  
 Of the 19 collective agreements, 11 use seniority-based job security provisions, 4 
collective agreements use periodic assessments, while two provide for the possibility of 
conversion and two have only minimal job security provisions. It should be noted that the 
seniority-based job security provisions vary greatly from accrual of seniority from the first 
appointment to seniority accrual following an assessment after five instances of teaching a 
course, and everything in between. Thus, it may be more accurate to say that assessment-
based and seniority-based job security provisions represent a spectrum. Nevertheless, it is 
significant for employees whether they have to requalify for a job they have been doing for 
years. Requiring requalification is contrary to the fundamental labour notion that dismissal 
should be limited to cause.  
 Again, we considered whether this fundamental labour right was addressed more 
consistently in collective agreements negotiated by the large public-sector unions. This did not 
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turn out to be the case. There are instances of strong job security protections in agreements 
negotiated by faculty associations, and minimal job security protections in agreements 
negotiated by public-sector unions. There does not appear to be a trend. What is striking, 
however, is that the vast majority of collective agreements protect job security in significant 
ways. At the same time, contract academic staff continues to be subject to assessment and 
layoffs. The former might be explained by the context of the academic workplace, where 
regular academic staff are subject to assessments for tenure and promotion. The latter is 
consistent with the contingent nature of the work. One could argue that some contract 
academic staff get the worst of both worlds. Unionization appears to have ameliorated but not 
overcome this challenge. 
Benefits 
 Next, we considered any fringe benefits contract academic staff are entitled to in their 
collective agreements. We categorized fringe benefits according to level of benefits provided. 
The most comprehensive collective agreements provided both fringe benefits and pension 
benefits. Four of 19 collective agreements fell into this group. A second group of collective 
agreement provided for health benefits and leaves but did not include pension benefits.  
Another four made up this group. A third group provided at least one benefit in addition to 
what was required under employment standards legislation.  There were eight collective 
agreements in this group. Typically, the additional benefit was paid leave of some kind. One 
collective agreement offered membership in a defined contribution pension plan but no health 
benefits. A final group with three collective agreements merely confirmed benefits required by 
employment standards legislation. It appears that fringe benefits were more comprehensive in 
21
Hughes and Bell: Bargaining for Contract Academic Staff at English Canadian Univer
Published by The Keep, 2015
 22 
collective agreements negotiated by public service unions. Only one faculty association 
agreement provided for pension benefits. Most of the faculty association agreements provided 
for ESA or ESA plus benefit levels. 
 We considered a second set of benefits related to academic work. These included 
professional development allowances, sabbatical leaves, conference funds and tuition waivers. 
All but two collective agreements provided for such academic benefits. There was, however, a 
fair range of the levels of benefit provided. There did not appear to be a trend of either faculty 
association agreements or public service union agreements providing richer benefits in this 
regard. 
So far, we have seen the three top bargaining priorities for contract academic staff: 
wages, job security and benefits. Wages appeared to be determined by the size of the 
employer. Improvements in job security were found in all collective agreements, albeit to a 
varying degree. Finally, fringe and academic benefits were common, but public service union 
agreements tended to be more comprehensive. 
A second set of questions related to the status of the union and its ability to represent 
its membership. We attempted to analyze the collective agreements in this regard by 
considering limits on management rights, supports offered by the employer for union work, and 
the integrity of the bargaining unit. 
Management rights 
Unsurprisingly, all collective agreements contain management rights clauses. It is 
generally thought that stronger collective agreements limit management rights through a 
"natural justice" or fairness obligation. In the absence of such an obligation, all matters not 
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specifically addressed in the collective agreement (or in documentation and/or legislation 
incorporated or deemed incorporated) falls outside of the scope of union representation and 
cannot support a grievance. Thus, a fairness obligation protects workers in two ways: it imposes 
on the employer a limit on the exercise of management rights, and it broadens the scope of 
matters subject to the grievance procedure. Of the 19 collective agreements in our study, 8 
include such a fairness obligation. Of these, 4 are CUPE locals, 2 are faculty associations, one is 
independent and one is a PSAC local. Curiously, only one of the 4 collective agreements 
covering both full-time and contract academic staff includes a fairness obligation in its 
management rights clause. This makes it clear that neither the full-time nor the contract 
academic membership achieved fairness language in 4 out of 5 agreements. Similarly, only 4 of 
the 9 CUPE locals achieved fairness language. We speculated that because management rights 
clauses are infrequently opened, more recent first collective agreements might be more likely 
to include fairness language. This does not turn out to be the case.  
 There are still several possible explanations for the phenomenon. Limited management 
rights clauses can be understood as an indicator of bargaining strength on the side of the union 
but the absence of such limitations may not be an indicator of bargaining weakness. This is so 
because management rights clauses are not inherently strikeable issues. The absence of 
limitations can also be an indicator of a collaborative rather than an adversarial labour relations 
environment. An employer that considers itself generally bound by fairness obligations may not 
be in the habit of imposing unilateral workplace rules, and thus avoids such a demand at the 
table. Finally, the absence of limitations may speak to the labour expertise of negotiators. Since 
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members are highly unlikely to be aware of the need for such language, a bargaining process 
driven by a member demands would typically not yield a demand for fairness language.  
 In our sample, it seems reasonable to assume that all of the locals of large public sector 
unions would have been aware of the desirability of fairness language.  Similarly, model 
language --including fairness suggested by CAUT --been available to bargaining teams for 
faculty associations. Gauging from the mood at national council meetings of the CAUT, it also 
seems likely to us that a collaborative labour environment cannot be said to have prevailed in 
Canadian universities over the last few bargaining cycles. Therefore, it seems most likely that 
the absence of fairness language is indeed an indicator of employer hostility or, possibly, 
relatively poor bargaining strength. The surprising finding that this extends to some full-time 
collective agreements as well supports the notion that employers may be equally hostile to 
their regular academic staff or that bargaining power may be relatively weak in various places 
across the academic sector. 
Enabling union work 
Organizing, negotiating and ultimately administering a collective agreement requires 
considerable resources. Some of these can be provided centrally. For example, some unions 
provide chief negotiators to their locals. An illustration of this is Memorial University where the 
contract academic staff agreement was negotiated by a PSAC staff negotiator. National unions 
can also provide training, grievance support, legal and advocacy support and financial 
assistance. Even taking all of this into account, there is no question that much of the work has 
to be carried out by bargaining unit members as volunteers, or by the staff of the local. Most 
academic bargaining units are too small to support a large staff. This is particularly true of 
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contract academic units where the job insecurity of the membership also translates into 
insecurity of dues receipts for the union. For these reasons, we expected that many unions 
would attempt to negotiate clauses that saw the employer provide some support, maybe in the 
form stipends, for the ongoing work of the union. We discovered that 9 out of the 19 collective 
agreements we considered did contain such clauses. Both the scope and the focus of the 
support varied considerably among these 9 collective agreements. Some offered stipend 
support for bargaining, others offered stipend support for grievance administration. Some 
collective agreements provide for monetary lump sums to the union, others provide for 
individual member pay. Only one of the combined full-time and contract academic staff 
collective agreements provided for union work support for contract academics. This raises the 
question of whether full-time members in those bargaining units are typically in charge of 
negotiating and administering the collective agreement and, if so, what mechanisms are put in 
place to ensure that the interests of contract academic staff are represented appropriately. 
Overall, it appears that the work of unions for contract academic staff is reasonably well 
supported. Most of them are part of larger local unions or national unions and roughly half 
have negotiated employer support for the work of the union. The notable exception is Simon 
Fraser University, where contract academic staff are organized by an independent union and 
where the collective agreement does not include any employer support for union work. 
 As a third indicator of the ability of unions to represent the membership adequately, we 
considered whether the bargaining unit had sufficient integrity. For this purpose, we looked at 
recognition clauses. We hypothesized that employers might seek to fracture bargaining units by 
creating exceptions. In our experience, exclusions of individuals who perform bargaining unit 
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work from the bargaining unit for any reason tends to undermine the integrity of the bargaining 
unit, lead to jurisdictional disputes and weaken the work of the union. In this category, the 
inquiry was not focused on groups who are exempt because they belong to another union or 
are in a position of management that would traditionally exempt them from the union. 58% (11 
out of 19) of the institutions had recognition exemptions, while 42% (8 out of 19) either did not 
have a recognition exemption clause, or excluded only management employees or otherwise 
unionized employees.  
In those collective agreements that had recognition clauses of interest, those excluded could 
generally be classified into 3 sub-groups: professionals, teachers in programs that do not grant 
degrees, and clinical or applied teachers. Six institutions had such exclusions. Most had 
exclusions in more than one category. It appears that schools with professional programs are 
more likely also to have exclusions in non-professional categories. The history of these 
exclusions is not known to us. However, we consider it likely that they represent a mixture of 
employer-sought exclusions, and exclusions resulting from difficulties in attracting union 
support from professionals in the context of organizing drives. 
Considering the structure of bargaining units, support for union work and the scope of 
management rights together, we would suggest that unions representing contract academic 
staff operate in a challenging union environment. Bargaining units are relatively small and 
frequently fractured, and union members are subject to significant management rights. 
However, the integration of contract academic staff unions into larger public sector and/or 
faculty unions means that both the negotiations and the administration of collective 
agreements tends to be well supported.  
26
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 The final line of inquiry was whether contract academic staff enjoyed academic 
freedom. One of the concerns associated with casualization in the academic sector has long 
been that casual academic workers would not enjoy academic freedom.  Regular academic staff 
has long considered academic freedom not only a hallmark of academic work, but also a core 
requirement enabling teaching and research in the university context. Collective agreements 
have the potential of being effective protectors of academic freedom. The job security regimes 
discussed above go some way towards providing contract academic staff with the security 
needed for the performance of academic work, though they clearly fall short of a grant of 
tenure.  
 Academic freedom clauses can also provide assistance. All but three of the collective 
agreements included an academic freedom clause. However, some fell far short of what is 
thought required to protect academic freedom.  We defined academic freedom as including the 
right to (1) criticize and/or scrutinize the employer and (2) allow instructors to exercise their 
academic freedom beyond the confines of their discipline. Only 31% (6 out of 19) of the 
collective agreements examined met this requirement. While many collective agreements 
included a reference to academic freedom, only 31% gave employees the express freedom to 
criticize their employer and did not limit academic freedom to their discipline. The remaining 
58% (11 out of 19) did not meet the standard for academic freedom as defined in this research. 
This 58% excludes 2 collective agreements that did not have any clause in relation to academic 
freedom. Thus, in total there were 68% collective agreements that did not meet the required 
standards to have meaningful academic freedom, 2 of which did not make reference to any sort 
of academic freedom for their contract academic staff. Faculty associations negotiated 4 of the 
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6 collective agreements that protected academic freedom fully. Of the remaining two, one was 
a CAUT-affiliated CUPE local and the other was represented by PSAC. This suggests that faculty 
associations may be putting a higher premium on protecting academic freedom than public 
service unions. That said, of the 2 collective agreements that did not make any mention of 
academic freedom, one was independent and the other one was a CAUT-affiliated CUPE local.  
 The data suggest that the concerns over the loss of academic freedom through 
casualization are well-founded. We can only speculate about the reasons for the relatively poor 
showing. From our own bargaining experience, we know that our employer was reluctant to 
agree to a full academic freedom clause for contract academic staff but, after many weeks of 
negotiations on this issue, ultimately agreed because of a pre-existing campus-wide policy that 
granted academic freedom to all members of the academic community.  
5. Conclusion  
Contract academic staff have benefitted considerably from the unionization movement that 
began four decades ago. While wages appeared to be highly correlated with the size of the 
employer, unionization has resulted in wage increases. We also found improvements in job 
security in all collective agreements, albeit to a varying degree. Fringe and academic benefits 
are also a direct result of unionization. They were common, and we found that public service 
union agreements tended to be more comprehensive. 
 However, despite these successes, the experience of contract academic staff continues 
to support the existing critiques of the Wagner Act model as applied to contingent labour. The 
wage disparity between full-time and contract academic staff should be understood as the 
direct consequence of the fractured bargaining environment that is promoted by the Wagner 
28
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 10 [2015], Art. 35
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss10/35
 29 
Act model. Both the ubiquity of certification of contract academic units and their relative 
bargaining successes can be attributed to a highly unionized environment in the academic 
sector and either the support by or union competition from faculty associations. Given the size 
and structure of bargaining units, unions representing contract academic staff operate in a 
challenging union environment. However, the integration of contract academic staff unions into 
larger public sector and/or faculty unions means that both the negotiations and the 
administration of collective agreements appear to be reasonably well supported. 
The data supports the concerns about the threat to academic freedom from casualization.  
 What can we learn from contract academic staff unions for other contingent labour? 
First, unionization of residual groups of nonunionized workers in sectors with great union 
density is easier than the expansion of unions into new sectors. Competition between unions 
may be helpful rather than problematic in this regard. Secondly, contingent workers can expect 
real benefits from unionization but, realistically, should not expect transformative change. 
Finally, bargaining power of contract academic unions is weakened because the same 
difficulties that make certification challenging for precarious workers also result in considerable 
challenges in the administration and improvement of collective agreements. The contingency of 
work puts pragmatic limits on the ability of unions to mobilize workers in support of job action.  
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